**Findings from a quick literature review:**

**1) Western European far-right voters are dissimilar from Eastern European ones. Unless we find the same college effect in Eastern Europe we should stick to Western Europe**

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354068815593457>

Scholarship on far right parties in Post-Communist Europe has borrowed findings and analytical frameworks from studies on the Western European far right. Similarly, studies on Western European far right parties have increasingly referenced instances of far right success in post-communist states. These parties are similar in their Euroskepticism and exclusionary populism. However, little work has compared voters for the far right between regions. Different political opportunity structures have consequences for far right voter profiles in four important respects. First, the linkage between anti-immigrant attitudes and far right support is stronger in Western Europe. Second, far right voters in Western Europe are less religious than their post-communist counter-parts. Third, post-communist far right voters are economic leftists, whereas rightist attitudes toward income redistribution slightly predict a far right vote in Western Europe. Finally, far right voters in Western Europe are more satisfied with democracy as a regime type.

**2) Low levels of formal education as predictors of of both abstention and far right support**

- Paper has table of far-right parties in Western European countries for us to use

- Age stronger predictor than education

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379416304000>

This article compares far right voters in Western Europe with citizens who abstain from electoral participation. Political dissatisfaction is thought to motivate both forms of political behavior. Low levels of formal education are also significantly predictive of both abstention and far right support. This study implements a multilevel multinomial logistic regression comparing nonvoters, far right voters, and voters for other parties from 2002 to 2012. The results suggest that common predictors distinguishing far right voters, such as education and political distrust, do not distinguish far right voters from abstainers. However, measures of social integration, including union membership, self-reported social activity, and trust in other people, are positively predictive of far right over abstention. Conversely, far right party voters and voters for other parties display similar levels of political interest and social integration. Other issues, such as Euroskepticism and anti-immigrant attitudes are more common among far right voters, and distinguish them from both other voters and those who just stay home.

**3) Education causally reduces anti-immigrant sentiment – not just an effect of self-selection bias**

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/education-and-antiimmigration-attitudes-evidence-from-compulsory-schooling-reforms-across-western-europe/15551FC325C118588CF61113697488A3>

Low levels of education are a powerful predictor of anti-immigration sentiment. However, there is little consensus on the interpretation of this correlation: is it causal or is it an artifact of selection bias? We address this question by exploiting six major compulsory schooling reforms in five Western European countries—Denmark, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden—that have recently experienced politically influential anti-immigration movements. On average, we find that compelling students to remain in secondary school for at least an additional year decreases anti-immigration attitudes later in life. Instrumental variable estimates demonstrate that, among such compliers, an additional year of secondary schooling substantially reduces the probability of opposing immigration, believing that immigration erodes a country’s quality of life, and feeling close to far-right anti-immigration parties. These results suggest that rising post-war educational attainment has mitigated the rise of anti-immigration movements. We discuss the mechanisms and implications for future research examining anti-immigration sentiment.

**4) We should be careful generalizing about far-right support between countries**

[**https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2C93B9C18341B38768DF216604FDBBA2/S1755773917000145a.pdf/what\_unites\_the\_voter\_bases\_of\_populist\_parties\_comparing\_the\_electorates\_of\_15\_populist\_parties.pdf**](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2C93B9C18341B38768DF216604FDBBA2/S1755773917000145a.pdf/what_unites_the_voter_bases_of_populist_parties_comparing_the_electorates_of_15_populist_parties.pdf)

Education exerts a negative and statistically significant effect in 6 out of the10 radical right cases. When it comes to voting for other populist parties, however,education does not exert a statistically significant effect. Age is negatively related topopulist voting in 6 out of the 15 cases under analysis. In only three cases gender isnegatively related to populist voting.